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THERE AND BACK AGAIN-AN INDIAN HOBBIT'S
HOLIDAY "INDIANS TEACHING INDIAN LAW"
G. WILLIAM RICE*
All that is gold does not glitter,
Not all those who wander are lost;
The old that is strong does not wither,
Deep roots are not reached by the frost,
From the ashes a fire shall be woken,
A light from the shadows shall spring;
The truth again shall be spoken,
Our songs once more we shall sing.'
Having only recently wandered into the academy from the gilded world
of a private Indian law practice, I was pleasantly surprised when Professor
Zuni invited me to speak to this conference on the subject of "Indians
teaching Indian law." It seemed a simple assignment. However, on deeper
reflection, I began to feel like Professor Tolkien's Hobbit, Bilbo Baggins,
must have felt when confronted by the wizard, Gandalf. From a simple
"good morning," Bilbo elicited the "perfect" law professor's response:
'What do you mean?' [Gandalf] said. 'Do you wish me a good morning,
or mean that it is a good morning whether I want it or not; or that you
feel good this morning; or that it is a morning to be good on?' ' ' 2 "'All
of them at once,' said Bilbo," 3 which shows that he was a quite good
third year law student, or possibly a citizen of the Legal Academia himself.
Like poor Bilbo, the wizard confronted me as I wrestled with the ambiguities
inherent in the statement of the topic for discussion.
What does it mean to address the topic "Indians teaching Indian Law?"
The topic by definition does not, given the context of this conference,
include the subject of non-Indians teaching Indian Law.4 Others will address
that topic during the conference proceedings. Likewise, we are not especially
concerned here with teaching in an Indian law clinic. The issues particular
to the clinical approach to teaching are also the subject of other proceedings.
Finally, we are generally to consider classroom work whose subject is
"Indian law." Therefore, we must draw a line somewhere between those
courses that are "Indian law" courses and those that are not.
With these distinctions, however, comes the threat of dragon's fire as
we depart upon our quest for the Lonely Mountain. To address adequately
the topic of Indians teaching Indian law in the classical "stand-up" teaching
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Tulsa School of Law. Adjunct Professor of Law,
Cornell Law School. B.A., Phillips University, 1973; J.D., University of Oklahoma College of Law,
1978. Member, United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians in Oklahoma.
1. My apologies to J. R. R. TOLKIEN, THE FELLOWSEI OF THI RING 260 (Easton Press, 1984).
2. J. R. R. TOLKIEN, Ti HOBBrr 12 (Easton Press 1984).
3. Id.
4. Although the following discussion should make it clear that Indians can bring a unique
perspective to the teaching of law generally, and to Indian law courses in particular, the position
that non-Indians should not be engaged in teaching Indian law courses is flawed.
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mode, one must first raise two important and difficult questions for which

there may be no satisfactory answers. First what is "Indian law," and

then, who is an "Indian?" Answers to these questions would not necessarily
resolve the ambiguities inherent in the description of the topic of this paper,
even if the academy and the Indian world could agree upon one set of
answers. Briefly touching upon these issues is, however, important to create
a frame of reference for, and perhaps provoke, further discussion. With
these issues in mind, one may also better determine what Indian law
professors could bring to the teaching of law generally, and Indian law
teaching in particular. As a final preliminary matter, I must disclaim any
authority to speak for my clan, my tribe, other Indians generally, and
Indian law professors in particular.'
I. AVOIDING THE GOBLINS' LAIR: WHAT IS "INDIAN LAW?"
Asking a new initiate to the Legal Academia to describe the teaching
of Indian law is akin to asking the first-time reader of Tolkien to describe
a Hobbit. Perhaps, it will be sufficient simply to "know enough to go on
with," ' 6 without delving too deeply beneath the Misty Mountains and attempting to define the many varieties of "Indian law." Perhaps most
neglected in the legal education of our future litigators, judicial officers,
and lawyer-politicians is the study of tribal Indian law.' It must also be
realized that many states have constitutional, statutory, and decisional law
that relate specifically to Indians. Finally, Canada and other countries in
this hemisphere have a special body of law relating to Indians in their
capacity as Indians.
When most people think of "Indian law," however, they are thinking
of federal Indian law, defined here as the body of United States laws
dealing specifically with Indian tribes and Indian people.' It is difficult to

5. Traditional Indian people would recognize that the discussion which follows is neither an
attempt to speak for them without the authority to do so, nor an attempt to represent the monolithic
"Indian voice," see Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Racial Critiques of Legal Academia: A Reply in Favor
of Context, 43 STAN. L. REv. 137, 142 (1990), which I do not believe exists. I emphasize this
disclaimer because a majority of scholars may not be aware of the cultural and traditional impediments
which exist in the Indian world toward assuming authority to speak for another without the right
to do so. The nature of the instant topic, however, compels me to address the issue from my
position as one of the very few Indians who are tenured or tenure-track law professors, and I
make no apology for doing so.
6. THE HOBBIT, supra note 2, at 10.
7. As Congress and the courts continue to recognize the importance of tribal laws, and the
general jurisdictional powers of tribal courts, it is perhaps surprising that few law schools offer
any opportunity for students to become cognizant of, let alone competent in, the laws and legal
systems of Indian tribes-the third great set of governmental entities in this country having the
authority to decide important personal and property rights. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,
436 U.S. 49 (1978); National Farmer's Union Ins. Co. v. Crow tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845
(1985); Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
8. Much of the federal statutory law relating to Indians is found in Title 25 of the United
States Code entitled "Indians." Other statutes directly related to Indian tribes and Indian people
are scattered throughout the United States Code. While this body of law is impressive in itself, it
is only a small part of the federal law directly related to Indians. To obtain a more complete view
of "federal Indian law," one must also consider, at a minimum, the hundreds of treaties and
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characterize exactly what "federal Indian law" entails. Experience has shown
that "federal Indian law" impacts almost every conceivable field of law
currently studied in the schools of law in this country. From criminal cases
to Wall Street bond issues, from adoptions to intergovernmental relations,
from accounting to workers' compensation, the range of matters in which
"Indian law" can become the determining factor is perhaps as infinite as
the subjects that may come before the Bar for decision. I suspect that
many attorneys with whom I have crossed swords in litigation over the
years were shocked to learn that their "simple" contract or tort action
contained Indian law issues so significant as to affect or control the outcome
of the litigation. Yet, not every case involving an Indian tribe or person
is necessarily an Indian law case, and every statutory law that affects
Indians is not necessarily a part of "federal Indian law."
How, then, should we define our field of inquiry? Professors David H.
Getches, Charles F. Wilkinson, and Robert A. Williams, Jr. have made
a worthy attempt at defining the field on the first page of their casebook:
The field of federal Indian law involves a body of law that regulates
the legal relationships between Indian tribes and the United States. In
turn, notions of federalism dictate a unique relationship with the states
and their laws. The tribes, their members, and lands held by both are
affected by federal Indian law.'

Professors Robert N. Clinton, Nell Jessup Newton, and Monroe E. Price
also begin their casebook with the following description of the field of
Indian law:
The body of jurisprudence in the United States surrounding the legal
rights of Native Americans affords them a special protected status in
the American legal structure. Unlike other minority groups, whose primary legal protections arise from laws prohibiting discrimination designed
to facilitate their complete integration into the social, political, and
economic fabric of the country, Indians have enjoyed a legal status
that was, at the outset, designed primarily to protect their cultural
autonomy. Modern Indian law in the United States involves a special
protection of a se .mrate minority population that is currently designed
to facilitate Indian group autonomy.' 0
Rather than risking the goblin's maze to explore these and other possible
definitions of the term "Indian law," as well as the jurisprudential issues
encompassed within that phrase, let us assume for purposes of this discussion
that "federal Indian law" encompasses all federal laws that exercise federal
authority, or that allocate jurisdictional authority between the federal, tribal,
and state governments over persons, places, and subject matter when Indian
agreements between the United States and Indian tribes and statutes which are not codified in the
United States Code. See, e.g., KAPPLER, INDIAN AFFAIRs LAWS AND TREATIES (1974) (containing
decisional law of the federal courts, various solicitor's opinions, and the regulations of federal
agencies specifically dealing with Indians).
9. DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 1 (3d ed. 1993).
10. ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 1 (3d ed. 1991).
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tribes, Indian people, and Indian commerce are affected because of their
particular status as Indians.
I
RUMORS OF THE DRAGON: WHO IS AN INDIAN
When one hears the question, "Who is an Indian?" one should perhaps
automatically add the phrase, "For what purpose and by whose definition?' ' 1 2 The problem is that the question of "Indian" status is a unique
situation in which the generic misnomer "Indian" is used to describe
different, yet often overlapping, categories of persons who may lay claim,
legitimate or illegitimate, to the designation through various means. To
attach a "minority group" label such as "black," "female," or "German"
to an individual, is generally to designate their race or group based upon
reasonably clear and unalterable categories of race, sex, national origin and
the like. In contrast, to say someone is an "Indian" implies, for different
people, connotations of race, culture, social condition, legal status, political
status, and personal attitudes and preferences.
It should not surprise interested observers that the academic community
has difficulty in reaching a consensus concerning who is an Indian for
admissions and faculty recruitment purposes. These difficulties arise because
it is now often acceptable, and even sometimes advantageous, to bear the
designation of "Indian," and because the persons charged with solving the
dilemma are often attempting to answer the question from these different
perspectives simultaneously. Obviously, when one individual is speaking of
Indians as a cultural group, and another person is speaking of Indians in
13
a racial, social, legal, political or other context, differences of opinion
will arise. In such circumstances, the participants in the discussion may
not even understand the reasons for their different conclusions. Thus, one
participant will determine that an individual is in fact an Indian, while
another participant in the discussion may just as adamantly conclude that
the same individual is not Indian at all.
When one realizes the divergent perspectives from which the question
may be considered, both participants may in fact be correct-from their
own categorical perspective. They can, likewise, both be wrong-if viewed

II.

11. I have, on many occasions, been asked by well meaning colleagues and others whether I
preferred to be referred to as an "Indian" or by the (currently) more politically correct term "Native
American." My consistent response has been that I am Keetoowah. Whether the English language
designation is derived from the lost Genoese who thought his ship had landed on an island in the
Indies (Indian), see 4 WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA 860 (1989), or an Italian-Spanish sailor (Amerigo
Vespucci) whose name was placed on these continents by a German map maker due to his inflated
claims of "discovery" (Native American), see id. 20 at 357-58, is irrelevant to me as they are both
misnomers. I could just as easily ask a member of the majority group (Americans) whether they
wished for me to refer to them as Anglos, Europeans, or whites. Therefore, I will generally use
the term "Indian" in this paper as it is more predominantly used in the tribal community in which
I live.
12. For further information on this point, see CLINTON ET AL., supra note 10, at 83-108.
13. Obviously, it is irrelevant how these categorical viewpoints are distributed between the
participants of such a discussion. Matters are even more complicated when one or more of the
participants have internally incorporated two or more such categories into their definition of who
is an Indian and proceed to use their hybrid definition to make their individual determinations.
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from the other's perspective. Perhaps no acceptable answers are readily
available, but if the purposes for which one asks the question are kept in
mind, the topic may be easier to address rationally. 4 The purpose of the
question at this point is to determine a tentative definition suitable for the
discussion of the issue of Indians teaching Indian law. In doing so, we
shall consider four interrelated categorical standards by which an individual's
"qualifications" for Indian status could be judged: legal status,
political
status, racial status, and cultural or social status. 5
A person's legal status is generally determined by reference to the legal
system in which the question is raised. Each government decides for its
own purposes the standards for meeting the legal test it has established.
For tribal purposes, the government of an Indian tribe would decide whether
a person is an Indian by reference to tribal membership laws. 6 For state
government purposes, the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution generally
binds states to recognize as Indians those persons so recognized by federal
law. 7 States have also historically recognized some Indian tribes pursuant
to state law that the federal government had not necessarily recognized, 8
although in several cases such "state-recognized" tribes have since been
formally recognized by the United States.' 9 The United States federal government generally decides an individual's status as an Indian by reference
to federal law.20
In Morton v. Mancari,2' the United States Supreme Court held that being
"Indian" is not a racial classification, but instead refers to people who
occupy a distinct and unique political status. 22 The Court amplified its
holding that the preference extended to Indians in employment with the
Bureau of Indian Affairs was not a racial preference despite its characterization as such by the plaintiffs (qualified non-Indian employees denied

14. It may not always be possible to isolate a single category which will adequately identify
those who are "Indians" for the purpose for which the definition is desired. It must be understood
that the question is often asked in a context where one must include more than one category in
the discussion.
15. There should be no inference that these categories are mutually exclusive, nor that they are
inclusive of all possible categories through which one could frame a definition for consideration.
They are, however, sufficient to illustrate the point of this portion of the discussion.
16. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
17. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See also U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 8, cl.3 (vesting Congress with
the authority to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes).
18. Francis J.O'Toole & Thomas N. Tureen, Maine Indians-StatePower and the Passamaquoddy
Tribe: "A Gross National Hypocrisy?", 23 MAiNE L. R . 1 (1971). See also Joint Tribal Council
of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 649 (D. Me. 1975); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
22, § 4701 (West 1954) (defined as Indians allpersons of at least one-quarter degree of Indian
blood) repealed by ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 321 (West 1994).
19. Three Indian tribes in Maine, which prior to the Maine Indian Claim Settlement Act, Pub.
L. No. 96-420, 94 Stat. 1785 (1980) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1721-1735 (1988)), were recognized
only by the state government, are now formally recognized by the United States government. See
also Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 95-395, 92 Stat. 813 (1978) (codified
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1715 (1988)). This is not a complete list of such entities.
20. The concept of federal recognition by the government of the United States does not take
into consideration the tribes in Canada, Mexico, and other countries of this hemisphere.
21. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
22. Id. at 553.
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promotion in favor of qualified Indians). The preference is not directed

towards a racial group consisting of "Indians;" instead, it applies only to

members of "federally recognized" tribes. This operates to exclude many
In this sense,
individuals who are racially to be classified as "Indians."
23 This decision is
the preference is political rather than racial in nature.
the right of individual Indians
consistent with prior authority that recognized
2A and of Indian tribes to admit
to expatriate themselves from their tribe,
presumably
to full or restricted citizenship members of other tribes, and
2
citizenship.
to
admit
to
chooses
tribe
any person that the
The federal statutory definitions of the term "Indian" are generally
consistent with the Court's reasoning in Morton. The majority of the federal
' 27 as a person who is an enrolled
statutory definitions 26 define an "Indian
2
member of a federally recognized Indian tribe, band,29 or nation, 1 and
generally includes members of Alaska Native Villages. However, a few
statutory definitions provide additional or alternative categories such as

certification by a tribe,30 membership in terminated tribes or state-recognized

3
tribes and their descendants, or recognition by the Secretary of the Interior
3 2 while others limit the general rule by providing some
as an Indian,
33
additional requirement, such as residence on "Indian. land" or within a

23. !d. at 553 n.24. In the criminal law context see United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641
(1977) (1,olding that conviction of an Indian pursuant to the felony-murder rule contained in 18
U.S.C. § 1111, 1153 (1994) was not invidious racial discrimination even though a non-Indian
committing the same acts would have been tried under a state statute requiring proof of premeditation
and deliberation. P-oof of premeditation and deliberation was not required as elements of the federal
convictions).
24. United States ex rel. Standing Bear v. Crook, 25 F. Cas. 695 (D. Neb. 1879).
25. See Cherokee Intermarriage Cases, 203 U.S. 76 (1906); Cherokee Nation v. Journeycake,
155 U.S. 196 (1894). See also, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (finding that
Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (1990), did not create a claim for relief cognizable
in the federal courts despite allegations of discrimination on the basis of sex and ancestry in the
enrollment of those wi, were not tribal members). In Santa Clara, the tribe refused to accept as
members children of a female tribal member who had married outside the tribe, although the tribe
did accept as members the children of male tribal members who married outside the tribe. Santa
Clara, 436 U.S. at 51.
26. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1722 (1988); 20 U.S.C. § 80q-14 (1988); 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (1988); 20
U.S.C. § 4402 (1988); 25 U.S.C. § 450b (1988); 25 U.S.C. § 1452 (1988); 25 U.S.C. § 1903 (1988);
25 U.S.C. § 3202 (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 3002 (1988). This list is by no means all-inclusive, as there
are in excess of thirty-five federal statutory definitions of the term "Indian."
27. The term "Native American" is often classified so as to include Indians, Native Hawaiians
and Native American Pacific Islanders. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 7601 (1988); 25 U.S.C. § 2902 (1988);
38 U.S.C. § 3764 (1988).
28. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 4702 (1988); 25 U.S.C. § 450b (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 1996a (1988). This
also is not an all-inclusive list. Like the definition of "Indian," the term "Indian tribe" is generally
defined to mean a tribe, band, or nation recognized by the United States and eligible for federal
services because of their status as Indians. The term generally includes Alaska Native Villages.
However, additional groups such as state recognized tribes are sometimes included in the definition.
See e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 305e (1988).
29. See Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1602(b) (1988).
30. See The Indian Arts and Crafts Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1159 (1988), includes in the term "Indian,"
a person certified as an Indian artisan by an Indian tribe. See also 25 U.S.C. § 305e (1988).
31. 20 U.S.C. § 7881 (1988).
32. 25 U.S.C. § 1603 (1988).
33. 18 U.S.C. § 437 (1988).
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particular state,3 or ownership of trust or restricted Indian land. 35 However,
the federal statutory definitions of who is an Indian depend primarily on
the political affiliation of an individual as a member of a federally recognized
Indian tribe.
The political status of a person as a citizen of an Indian tribe is generally
determined by the tribes through their inherent powers of self-government.36
The common law, 37 constitutions, and statutes of Indian tribes provide the

criteria for membership in the tribe. The criteria used often include such
3s
39
matters as blood quantum,

birth to paternal (or maternal) tribal members,

membership in a particular clan,40 or some combination of similar criteria.

Traditional and current notions of tribal citizenship or membership thus
include factors based upon race and national origin, as well as traditional,
cultural, religious, and other values.
I will be the first to confess that a rational general classification of racial
and cultural "Indians". eludes me. As to the racial issue, some tribes such

as the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma include in their eligible membership

all persons who can show that they possess any quantum of Cherokee
blood based upon the Dawes Rolls of 1906. Others require a specific
minimal Indian blood quantum to attain eligibility for membership. 4 At

what point can one draw a line between those who are racially "Indian"

and those who are not? Should all Indian blood be counted in such
considerations, or only that of a specific tribe under consideration? 42 Can,
and should, questions of race be divorced from issues of culture and
recognition by the Indian community?
Cultural issues are often intertwined with the issue of race and are
likewise difficult to quantify. 43 For instance, very few would argue that a

34. 25 U.S.C. § 651 (1988).
35. 25 U.S.C. § 2101 (1988).
36. FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 20-23 (1982 ed.). The exceptions
to
this rule generally involve tribes whose rolls have been closed by specific agreement with the
tribe
or by a specific act of Congress.
37. I use the term "common law" here intentionally to describe the customs, traditions, and
cultural rules of conduct of Indian tribes which are enforced by tribal law. I do so because tribal
customs, traditions, and cultural rules are entitled to no less respect than American customs, traditions,
and cultural rules and therefore choose to designate each of them with the same term.
38. See Slattery v. Arapahoe Tribal Council, 453 F.2d 278 (10th Cir. 1971).
39. See Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1039 (10th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 436 U.S. 49
(1978).
40. ARTHUR C. PARKER, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FivE NATIONS 11 42-54 (Syracuse Univ.
Press, 1968). The Constitution of the Five Nations also contained rules of naturalization for foreigners.

Id. 1 66-70.

41. It seems that the minimal blood quantum required by most tribes lies somewhere between
one-eighth and five-eighths with one-fourth being the "standard."
42. Some federal statutes do include or exclude persons on the basis of their blood degree
certain federal services, programs, or benefits. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 480, 482, 585, 903b, for
971,
1300h-3 (1988). It is unclear whether some of these blood-quantum requirements may have
been
enacted at the request of the affected tribes.
43. For instance, there are additional issues at work among those who meet every federal and
tribal definition of "Indian" in use by the United States government and the federally recognized
Indian tribes. One of these can be characterized by what I call the distinction between those
who
may, perhaps, be denominated "American Indians" as opposed to those who might be called "Tribal
Indians." This distinction is a direct outgrowth of the forced assimilation policy to which Indian
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linguist or anthropologist from London, England, who had learned to speak
an Indian language and studied that particular tribe's recorded cultural
traits, is an Indian. Yet there are those who argue that you are not "really
Indian" unless you can speak the language and know your tribe's particular
culture. Most would recognize the full-blood Indian who was enrolled in
a federally recognized tribe as an Indian, even if the individual was adopted
at birth by a non-Indian family and had never set foot in the Indian
country nor met another Indian. Such an individual meets almost every
federal statutory definition. Compare the foregoing with the case of the
full-blood Indian who is one-eighth blood quantum of eight different tribes,
each of which require a one-fourth blood quantum for recognition and
enrollment. Even if that person speaks all eight languages and is expert
in all eight tribal cultures, that person would not meet most of the statutory
definitions of the term "Indian," being no more Indian in the law for
most purposes than our British anthropologist. It is perhaps oxymoronic
to speak of a non-Indian Indian or of an Indian non-Indian. Yet in human
terms, this is the result allowed by law, and the source of much confusion
and controversy-all thoughts of Wannabe (Want-to-be) Indians aside. How,
then, do we find our way out of the Enchanted Forest?
These, and other questions, haunt the Mirkwood on our path to the
dragon's lair. Perhaps the best that can be done with the racial and cultural
categories is to state that the term "Indian" in most circumstances assumes
a significant racial identity with the indigenous people of these continents
and at least some cultural and social contact with a tribal community."
The precise extent and nature of possible cultural qualifications, or the
proportion of aboriginal (Indian) blood needed to qualify could be the
subject of unending argument. If one approaches the question from a legal
or political posture pursuant to federal law, the racial and cultural issues
are generally subsumed in the individual determinations by federally recognized tribes of the categories of persons that the tribe will acknowledge
as its citizens. Thus, tribal membership generally, could provide a touchstone
for a working definition of "Who is an Indian?" However attractive such
a definition could be from its simplicity, it will not suffice as a sufficient

tribes have been subjected, and is perhaps a measure of the success, or lack of success, of that
policy. One's outlook on the world in general, and upon Indian issues in particular, can be significantly
impacted by whether one conceives of oneself as an American who happens to be an Indian, or
as a tribal citizen who has been granted American citizenship by an act of Congress subsequent
to colonization.
44. One federal statutory attempt to provide a definition of the term "Indian" which would
address the various legal, political, racial, and cultural categories through which the term could be
defined can be found in the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 479 (1988), which provides:
The term Indian as used in [this Act] shall include all persons of Indian descent
who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction,
and all persons who are descendants of such members who were, on June 1, 1934,
residing within the present boundaries of any Indian reservation, and shall further
include all other persons of one-half or more Indian blood. For the purposes of
[this Act], Eskimos and other aboriginal peoples of Alaska shall be considered
Indians.
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and complete definition as it fails to recognize many persons whom many
would not hesitate to call "Indians. '45
Unless we accept a federal definition, or a tribe-by-tribe determination
of such issues, we must attempt some other conclusion on the matter. The
only certainty regarding any conclusion here is that it is arguable. So now,
feeling not unlike Bilbo sitting by the back door to the Lonely Mountain
as his companions urged him to approach the dragon's lair, I shall hazard
the task of proposing a working definition for purposes of this conference.
For purposes of this discussion of "Indians teaching Indian Law," I propose
the following definition of the term "Indian":
The term "Indian" means:
1. A member or citizen by blood of a tribe formally recognized as
an Indian tribal entity indigenous to this hemisphere by the United
States, any State of the United States, or other recognized government
in this hemisphere (including Indian tribes so recognized), or
2. A lineal descendant in the first or second degree of a person
identified in the preceding paragraph who has resided for a significant
period in an Indian tribal community, or
3. A lineal descendant of the indigenous people of this hemisphere
who is of at least one-quarter degree of Indian (indigenous) blood, and
who has resided for a significant period in an Indian tribal community.
I do not claim that this definition should suffice for all purposes, nay not
even for law school recruitment and admission purposes. Yet having faced
the dragon, perhaps I will have come away only slightly singed if we can
discuss the assigned topic knowing the definitional difficulties inherent in
the subject matter.46
III.

THE SEARC-I FOR THE ARKENSTONE: INDIANS
TEACHING INDIAN LAW
Having thus avoided the goblins (or worse) sulking about under the
Misty Mountains, and having once risked the dragon's lair, we wander at
last into the Great Hall beneath the Lonely Mountain, and can attempt
to conclude our quest. Like our path through the Mirkwood forest, the
search for the Arkenstone of Thrain is also full of peril, for teaching
connotes much more than standing before a class, and it appears that we
45. For instance, such simplicity would preclude recognition of members of tribes from Canada,
Mexico, or Central and South America. It would also preclude many persons who are of onequarter or more degree of total Indian blood who live within, and as a part of recognized Indian
communities.
46. For instance, I have intentionally set no limits on what a "significant period" for residence
within an "Indian tribal community" means. The purpose of including this phrase within the
definitional language is simply to indicate that an individual within the second and third paragraphs
of the definition should be required to show that they have some continuing cultural and social
contact with Indian people. Of course, there are those who would argue that even members of
recognized tribes should also be required to show that they have social and cultural contacts with
Indian people. However, for the most part, it may be safe to assume that the significant majority
of such persons do retain social and cultural ties with their relatives in the tribal community,
although I recognize that the assumption will sometimes fail.
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must search diligently through the golden multitude which is the legal
academy to find the few gems that are the object of our discussion.
First, a few words about teaching in general, and teaching Indian law
in particular. Classroom teaching has been described as, both an art and
a crafty.4 As a craft, classroom teaching can be learned through diligent
effort, and, when well executed, can fulfill the deepest intellectual yearnings
of the brightest of law students. 4 As an art form, classroom teaching may
transcend the basic need to instruct and inform, and inspire students to
grow beyond the abilities and dreams of the teacher to become shining
gems in their own right. In the classroom, we should endeavor to prepare
our students to slay the goblins we have avoided in their tunnels, and the
dragons still waiting within their lairs, for regardless of the battle trophies
that may line the walls of our cloistered offices or adorn the books of
reported decisions, our students will find their personal goblins, hobgoblins,
orcs, and dragons awaiting them out there in the real world. In the shaping
of our "briefcase warriors" of the future in the classroom, we must never
hesitate to cleave, however gently, the rough stone that is the law student,
for it is not the dull rough stone, but the gem which shines, 49and the
shaped flint that cuts through myth, ignorance, and superstition.
Teaching, within the world of the academy, also encompasses-nay demands-scholarship. As my friend Rennard Strickland has so eloquently
and the obligation
stated, "serious scholarship is the duty, the privilege, 50
Scholarship is a
community."
academic
the
in
live
of all who choose to
the rewards of
and
tenure
for
required
is
it
duty, not so much because
1 but because it will enhance our ability effectively to instruct
academic life,
and inspire our students, the attorneys, judges, leaders, and role-models
of tomorrow. Scholarship is a privilege because we are among the few
paid to engage in serious study and the pursuit of knowledge for its own
sake. We should, therefore, pursue knowledge that can be disseminated
both to our students and the world at large to promote the exchange of
ideas and enhance understanding of the law and legal system from our
various points of view. Scholarship is an obligation, particularly for the

47. See Alfred C. Yen, The Art and Craft of Teaching, 10 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 241
(1991).
48. Traditional forms of teaching law in the classroom include the Socratic case method used
to concentrate on specific forms of judicial reasoning, lectures aimed at imparting information or
summarizing points which should have been gleaned from socratic exercises, and the problem method
used to develop skills of logic, analysis, and solving new problems from known rules. See Yen,
supra note 47, at 242; Charles Richard Calleros, Variations on the Problem Method in First-Year
and Upper-Division Classes, 20 U. SAN FRAN. L. REV. 455, 455-57 (1986).
49. As Professor Skillman has observed, minority law students are often advised, intentionally
or unintentionally, that "survival" during their law school career and passing the bar examination
is their ultimate goal. Nerissa Bailey-Scott Skillman, Misperceptions Which Operate as Barriers to
the Education of Minority Law Students, 20 U. SAN FRAN. L. REV. 553, 554 (1986). While we
may accept survival by our students, and certainly should assist those in academic difficulty to the
extent possible, we should expect and promote the attainment of excellence.
50. Rennard Strickland, Scholarship in the Academic Circus or the Balancing Act at the Minority
Side Show, 20 U. SAN FRAN. L. REV. 491, 497 (1986).
51. See James E. Jones, Jr., Why Teaching-The Rewards of Academic Life, 10 ST. Louis U.
PuB. L. REV. 231 (1991).
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Indian law professor, because only one who has experienced the Indian
world from the inside can express, share, or defend the view of the tribal
communities from which we draw our strength.5 2
In preparation for this conference, I attempted to identify those persons
teaching in American law schools who claimed Indian descent or status,
both through the statistics on law professors published by the Association
of American Law Schools (AALS) and a questionnaire53 mailed to each
professor listed in The AALS Directory of Law Teachers 1994-95 as having
an interest in Native American law. A copy of the questionnaire was also
mailed to the Dean of each American Bar Association approved law school
with a letter requesting that the questionnaire be forwarded to any faculty,
regardless of rank, who claimed Indian descent or who taught any course
related to Indian law without regard to Indian descent. The response to
that survey was most gratifying, and I would like to take this opportunity
publicly to thank each school and each of my colleagues who responded. 54

52. See Strickland, supra note 50, at 499. This is not to say, however, that non-Indians have
no role in defending tribal communities and individual Indians in the legal battles in which they
become engaged, nor that non-Indians cannot share their knowledge and skills with tribal communities.
Non-Indians do contribute to critically important endeavors regarding Indians and Indian law. The
creation of the Native American Rights Fund, the American Indian Scholarship Program, Cohen's
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, and Kappler's INDIAN AFFAIRs LAWS
AND TREATIES are all
examples of the efforts of non-Indians who contributed mightily to Indian people and Indian
law
scholarship. See id. I do, however, tend to agree with Professor Johnson's position that scholars
of color, in this case an Indian, can speak from a distinct perspective (as an Indian) "when
they
intend to do so and when they are perceived by others as speaking with that unique voice."
See
Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Racial Critiques of Legal Academia: A Reply in Favor of Context, 43 STAN.
L. REv. 137, 138 (1990). In short, a double barrelled shotgun will be perceived differently depending
upon whether one has his finger on the trigger, is looking down the barrels, or is viewing the
encounter dispassionately from the side. While each of the hypothetical observers could perhaps
describe and evaluate the shotgun, I submit that the one who has looked down those barrels will
have an entirely different perspective from the others. However, for our purposes, it is perhaps
most important to understand that if the voice of any of these three observers is silenced or missing,
the full and complete story of the encounter can never be told. The reader should also be aware
that I do not subscribe to the position that Indian law professors should necessarily or exclusively
publish in the field of Indian law.
53. I make no claim that this questionnaire was scientific in the sense of providing any significant
statistical data, nor that it is conclusive as to the information obtained. I have not attempted
to
independently verify any of the information received from the respondents, and do not intend
to
do so. The results are presented here for whatever benefit may be obtained therefrom.
54. Sixteen schools were kind enough to submit a letter indicating that they had no persons on
their faculty who claimed Indian status or descent, and had no course offerings in the field
of
Indian law. I have not named these schools, nor some others referred to in this essay out of concern
that qualified Indian applicants might choose a different school if these institutions are identified
in this Article as having no Indian faculty or courses relating to Indian law. I believe such action
would be a mistake, as several of these schools indicated that they were actively searching
for
Indian professors and Indian students and wished to become active in the field of Indian law.
An interesting response was received from one associate dean refusing to forward the questionnaire
to the school's Indian law faculty on the assumption that hidden agendas underlying the questionnaire
were that faculty should prove their racial identity as an Indian prior to being allowed to teach
Indian law courses, and that non-Indians are somehow suspect as teachers and scholars in the
field
of Indian law because they are not Indian. The letter also contained a spirited defense of the Indian
and non-Indian faculty at the school who had contributed both to Indian law and other endeavors,
and warned of the divisiveness which could come from attempting to know whether Indians scholars
were speaking for Indians. While the good dean's assumptions were erroneous, I appreciated this
response because it emphasized the depth of tension inherent in the issues previously addressed
in
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I only wish that space and time allowed me to quote extensively from the
many comments received in response to the questionnaire.
According to the Association of American
Table 1: Tribal Affiliations
Law Schools, there are 8,231 full-time faculty
members at the 178 schools for which the
Cherokee
Association compiled data from its Directory
Cherokee
of Law Teachers 1994-95. Of the 7,368 fullCherokee
time faculty members who indicated their ethChoctaw
nicity, only 0.3% or twenty-two persons idenCitizen Band Potawatomi
tified themselves as Indians." In the sixty-four
Eastern Shawnee
responses to the survey received, twenty-two
Houma
as Indians 56 while
persons identified themselves
57
not.
did
forty-two
Lumbee
Mandan, Hidatsa, Arikara
Of those -claiming Indian descent or Indian
Mexican Indian
status, twelve claimed enrollment with federally
Mohawk
recognized Indian tribes. Two respondents were
members of state recognized Tribes. Two resOneida Indian Nation
pondents are from Tribes resident in Mexico.
Osage
Otoe-Missouria, Osage
The remaining six respondents claim Indian
Pawnee
descent ranging from an individual of onePima, Gila River
fourth degree of Indian blood in the process
Purepecha, Mexico
of enrollment with a federally recognized Tribe
& Apache
through individuals who simply claim some
Santee Sioux of Neb.
unspecified Indian descent. One individual in
Seneca Nation
this last group of six noted his Indian descent,
Turtle Mountain Chippewa
but disclaimed any cultural or social ties to
United Keetoowah Band
the Indian community noting that his blood
Camp Verde Yavapaiquantum was so slight that he did not generally
Apache
identify himself as an Indian." Table 1 lists
the tribes identified by the respondents.
The first question on the survey requested the name and address of

the essay. I do, however, believe that those who claim to speak as an Indian should be willing to
express their authority to do so. Responses to the questionnaire were received from faculty at the
school in question.
55. Memorandum from the Association of American Law Schools (AALS) 95-17 (May 2, 1995)
(with the AALS Statistical Report on Full-Time Law School Faculty as Prepared by Richard A.
White and dated May1, 1995).
56. There is some inaccuracy in these numbers, as several respondents are adjuncts, and I am
aware of at least two Indian scholars who have not submitted a response. As I have no documentation
of their generous personal assistance in this project, I have not included them in the data presented
here. However, the scarcity of Indians in the academy should be a source of concern for those
interested in diversity. Even if every individual claiming any Indian status or descent were at different
schools, only twelve percent of American law schools would have any Indians on their faculty. The
22 full-time Indian faculty identified in THE AALS DRECTORY oF LAw TEACHERS 1994-95 (1995)
constitute only 0.260 of all 8,231 full time faculty members.
57. I have placed in this grouping one respondent who identified herself as African-American,
but stated that she had a "great grand-relative" who was Indian. She did not, however, claim
direct descent from her Indian relative, and I have therefore included her in the list of non-Indian
law professors. If I have misread the survey response, I apologize to her. One dean wrote to state
that one non-teaching administrator at his school claimed some Indian descent, and to describe
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the respondent. The second question asked for the dates and schools at
which respondents received their law degrees.5 9 Other questions asked for
information concerning their current academic rank and status and the
respondents' total years spent teaching law. The answers to these questions
by the respondents who identified themselves as Indians are set out in
Table 2.

several courses which included Indian law components. Since I received survey response(s) from his
school, I have not included his administrator in these numbers as it may be duplicative. I do wish
to thank him for his letter.
58. For purposes of the following data compilations, all twenty-two persons who claimed some
Indian status or descent will be considered as "Indians" even if they might not meet the proposed
definition presented previously in this essay.
59. Some respondents did not answer every question. Therefore, the numbers stated here will
not always match the total number of responses received.
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One should note that only five of the Indian respondents reported teaching
law in excess of ten years. Twelve Indian respondents had been teaching
law for a total of five years or less.
The non-Indian respondents engaged in the teaching of Indian law also
responded to these same questions. Table 3 sets out the answers to these
questions submitted by the respondents who identified themselves as nonIndians. A comparison of the data obtained from the two groups is set
out in Table 4.
The two things that immediately appear significant from these numbers
are that we Indians who are law professors are so few, and generally
so new to the teaching experience. The numbers would be even more
stark if we did not include the three Indian law professors who have
been teaching for more than twenty years. The average Indian law professor

Year of Graduation
Law Professors Teaching Indian Law

1970 1971 1972 197319 1975197619771978197919801981 1982

[]

Non-Indian

L[]

Indian

was graduated more than five years after our non-Indian counterparts
who teaches Indian law. We have been at our current school less than
one-half as long, and have been teaching law for less than one-half as
long as our non-Indian counterpart. These factors may explain, in part,

Years of Teaching Experience
...
......

"::
:i~i.::!...:..

.......

Averages for Law Professors Teaching Indian Law

16

2
All Schools

Current School
M:

Indians

M

Non-Indians
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the fact that just over one-half as many Indians are, on a percentage
basis, tenured law professors when compared with their non-Indian counterparts teaching Indian law, because the average length of service of
the Indian law professor at their current institution is only five years.

Tenure Status
35

-

Law Professors Teaching Indian Law

Tenured

Tenure Track

EJ Indians

M

Non-Tenurable

Non-Indians

There is, comparatively, a significant percentage of Indians in the tenure
track. There is, however, a significantly larger percentage of Indians
(22.7%) teaching in law schools who are not on tenure track status than
for non-Indians teaching Indian law (14.30o). 60 Further, less than onethird of Indian teachers are full professors, while almost three-fourths
(71.407o) of non-Indian teachers of Indian law are full professors.

Academic Rank
Law Professors Teaching Indian Law
2520
15
10

Full Professor

I

Associate Professor

EI

Indians

Assistant Professor
[

Other

Non-Indians

60. Whether these small numbers can have any significance at all statistically is doubtful. In
addition, these percentages will probably not compare in the same manner if the Indians teaching
in law schools were compared on such issues to all law professors. However, at this conference
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What does this mean to our discussion of "Indians teaching Indian
law?" First, we are so few, and have been in the academy such a short
time, that the impact of the few Indians who have been working and
publishing in the field in the last decade is nothing short of amazing.
Remember, only five Indian respondents to the survey indicated that they
had been teaching law for more than eight years. Professor Kevin Worthen
of the J. Reuben Clark Law School at Brigham Young University spoke
for many Indian and non-Indian respondents to the Survey when he
wrote on the need for more Indians teaching law:
As a non-Native American, I believe that Indian [law] should not be
taught exclusively by Native Americans. But, there is a unique and
valuable perspective which Native Americans can bring to the subject.
This perspective is critical to the kind of understanding at the heart
of good teaching and scholarship. I don't believe we have reached
the level of critical mass yet. I think there will be a great synergy
as an increasing number of Native6 American scholars interact with
non-Native American law scholars.

1

Professor John LaVelle of the University of South Dakota School of
Law also spoke to this issue:
[Llaw schools [as a result of the widespread ignorance about, and
oppression of, Indian communities who are profoundly affected by
federal law] have an obligation to expose all students to Indian
professors whose very presence as professional teachers and scholars
will go a long way in dispelling stereotypes and dissipating residual
racism. Toward this end, it is essential that Indian professors be
assigned teaching responsibilities that will entail personal interactions
with a broad cross-section of students.6 2
I also believe that Indian people bring something to the academy that
cannot be measured in terms of years spent within the cloistered walls,
or even necessarily in numbers. Our roots on this island run deep, and
the memories handed down through our families, our clans, our Nations,
are strong. When I was a very young man, my elders told me that the
early treaties between my people and the United States were negotiated
through the use of Indian diplomatic protocols. I was also told of the
meaning of those agreements by a person who was old enough that he
personally knew, when he was young, an individual who had attended
the negotiation of one of those first treaties in his youth prior to 1800.
I was, therefore, one witness away from avoiding a hearsay objection

we are discussing the teaching of Indian law and so these comparisons are useful for that limited
purpose. I will leave to others the task of determining how these percentages would compare to
all law professors.
61. Comments of Professor Kevin Worthen, J. Reuben Clark Law School at Brigham Young
University, to G. William Rice, Associate Professor of Law, University of Tulsa School of Law,
in response to the Indian Law Survey (1995) (on file with the author).
62. Comments of Professor John Lavelle, University of South Dakota School of Law, to G.
William Rice, Associate Professor of Law, University of Tulsa School of Law, in response to the
Indian Law Survey (1995) (on file with the author).

Spring 19961

INDIANS TEACHING INDIAN LAW

to describing the process by which that treaty was negotiated. During
my career, I had occasion to find and read the transcripts of some of
those early negotiations, and was not at all surprised to find a written
journal recording the wampum diplomacy that is the heritage of my
people. As a people, Indians have different memories, different attitudes,
and have suffered through our unique perils as we have trod the road
of life to survival at the turn of this century.
The frost of racist and assimilative federal Indian policies has settled
deeply into the Indian country, yet our memories have not withered and
our roots yet retain their strength. We bring to the Academy not simply
a different racial or political perception of Indian law from our view
down the barrels of federal Indian policy, but a different view on other
aspects of the law that can enrich the learning experience for both students
and members of the academy. After two hundred years, the Congress
finally recognized the debt owed by this country to the League of the
Six Nations in the synthesis of ideas that bore fruit as the Constitution
of the United States, 63 and certain Senators have come to recognize the
critical importance which the knowledge of Indian law has for a Justice
of the Supreme Court of the United States. 64
Who can say that the unique perspectives of Indian professors will
not bring a deeper understanding, not only to the scholarly discussion
of Indian law, but to the scholarly melody dealing with constitutional
law, jurisprudence, alternative dispute resolution, conflicts of laws, comparative law, federalism, civil rights, international law, property, women's
rights and others. We are destined to sing our songs, not only to the
tune of Indian law, but to different tunes. We must sing the songs which
are ours, but must not allow ourselves to be limited to the drum nor
hesitate to lift our voices, whether in harmony or discord, with those
who sing these other songs of the academy. Above all, we must not
hesitate to speak the truth as we know it, and the academy, and perhaps
our legal system, cannot help but be expanded, enhanced, and enriched
as a result. As my colleague, Bruce Duthu stated in his response to the
questionnaire:
I accept that factors such as race, gender, class, etc. have clearly
played critical roles in the historical and social evolution of contemporary American society. I also accept that these very same factors
have played key roles in the evolution and development of law and
legal institutions.

63. See Gary D. Meyers, Different Sides of the Same Coin: A Comparative View
Of Indian
Hunting and Fishing Rights in the United States and Canada, 10 U.C.L.A. J. ENVTL.
L. & POL'Y
67, 76-77 n.52 (1991) (citing PETER MATTHIESSEN, INDIAN COUNTRY 6 (1984)).
64.
Though I am not yet convinced that Judge Ginsburg has this understanding, I am
voting for her confirmation. But I also want to put future Supreme Court nominees
on notice that I will insist they have an interest and understanding of Indian Country
law. After today, I will not vote for a nominee unless I am satisfied that they
have demonstrated this concern.
139 CONG. REc. S10089 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1993) (statement of Senator Pressler).
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Well, so what? ... [11f the "message" has been and is being
communicated-at least by some people in some places some of the
time-does it really matter who the "messenger" is? I think most
definitely yes. Why? Because we-those of us traditionally kept out
of circles of authority and power-come with different stories to tell.
We may talk about the same doctrines, the same legal trends, even
use the same casebooks! But we do have different stories, life histories,
which inform and enrich the conversations. And I happen to believe
that hearing other65people's stories always helps me understand them
a little bit better.
And so, as messengers of the truth, wheresoever you wander in your
teaching and scholarship, you will not be lost.
You will, however, be asked to be much more than a messenger and
singer of songs. There are those who will expect you to be the proverbial
"Super Indian": recruiter, role model, teacher, minority counselor, riot
control officer, pow-wow dancer, and magnificent scholar, while participating on every governing committee of the law school and university
when they cannot find another "minority representative" to do so-and
6
don't forget your community service. Do not misunderstand. Each of
these endeavors is worthy in and of itself. Each of them can matter in
a particular time and place, and some are essential to academic survival.
Yet we must understand that we cannot each do them all, and each of
us must select carefully the places where we feel that we can make a
in which
difference for ourselves, our people, and the larger community
67
we live. When it matters, we must matter mightily.
Finally, we must respect the vision of our brothers and sisters. We
must support and encourage one another, even when we disagree. We
have so few Indian colleagues that we cannot afford to throw any of
them away, and we must take time to help one another along the path
as we work to unearth the next generation of Indians teaching Indian
law. And somewhere, beneath the Lonely Mountain, we shall come to
the Arkenstone. When we do, when we have gathered together to light
the shadows and sing the truth, the fire of the Phoenix shall come forth
from the ashes to light our way-as, together with our non-Indian
colleagues, we begin our trek home to find that we can be the catalyst
for the renaissance of our people.

65. Letter from N. Bruce Duthu, Associate Professor of Law, Vermont Law School, to G.
William Rice, Associate Professor of Law, University of Tulsa School of Law, in response to the
Indian Law Survey (Aug. 23, 1995) (on file with the author).
66. Strickland, supra note 50, at 497.
67. Id. at 499.

